




















In this chapter I sum up the basic problems for a new theory of 21
st century financial 
crises in light of the Asian and other subsequent crises. My conclusion is that  there 
are indeed deep structural causes at work in the global markets that affect the political 
economy of  countries and regions. Methodologically, new concepts, models and 
theories are constructed, at ;least partially, to conduct further meaningful empirical 
work leading to relevant policy conclusions. This book belongs to the beginning of 
intellectual efforts in this direction. Political economic analyses at the country level, 
CGE modeling within a new theoretical framework, and neural network approach to 
learning in a bounded rationality framework point to a role for reforms at the state, 
firm and regional level. A new type of institutional analysis called the ‘extended 
panda’s thumb approach’ leads to the recommendation that path dependent hybrid 
structures need to be constructed at the local, national, regional and global level to 
lead to a new global financial architecture for the prevention--- and if prevention fails-
-- management of financial crises.   1 
 




Writing in 1926, in a biographical essay on Edgeworth, Keynes underlined some of the 
problems of complex human systems: 
 
We are faced at every turn with problems of organic unity, of discreteness, of discontinuity--- the whole 
is not equal to the sum of the parts, comparisons of quantity fail us, small changes produce large 
effects, the assumptions of a uniform and homogeneous continuum are not satisfied.
2 
 
If anything, the world economy today--- even more so than in the interwar years---shows the 
kind of complexity captured in Keynes’s words above. Fortunately, systems theory and 
economic theory have both made some progress since those dark days. Although we are far 
from a genuinely complete theory of complex economic systems, efforts are underway that 
have already borne some interesting fruit in several limited areas. The present endeavor can 
be seen as a modest step towards understanding some facets of complex open economies 
with financial systems. I have tried to orient my study methodologically in such a way that 
both the possibilities of inductive logic and deductions from principles can be fully utilized. It is 
important to stress the “realist” methodology implicit in this effort. The concrete “facts” are 
understood to be theory-laden. However, correct theoretical terms are taken to be exactly 
those that approximately refer to the real structure and dynamics of the global economy. In 
causal terms, complex causal structures can be inferred to the best of our ability by using the 
                     
1 Forthcoming in Haider A. Khan, Global Markets and Financial Crisis: A Theory for the 21
st Century Crises 
Based on the Asia’s Mangled Miracle, Chapter 9, Macmillan/Palgrave, 2004. 
2 Keynes(1971-9), Vol. X, p. 261   2 
conceptual, modeling and econometric techniques available to us at this moment. Given 
advances in theory and techniques in the future, our knowledge of the underlying causal 
relations can certainly improve. Thus, the results obtained in this book can only be viewed as 
tentative and subject to future revisions and updating. Yet, it must be said that by using a 
number of approaches--- historical and political economic, statistical, conceptual and formal 
nonlinear modeling approaches among them--- an attempt has been made to advance our 
knowledge of the dynamics of economies with complex financial systems as much as 
possible. In this final chapter I wish to sum up the most important aspects of my findings from 
two complementary points of view--- one positive and the other normative.  
 
The first is the analysis of complex economic systems. Here, methods of nonlinear modeling 
of both decisions in a single financial entity such as a bank, and of decisions in an economy 
wide framework have been used. For microanalysis, neural network approach in particular 
would seem to hold much promise. Although not widely used in economic analysis yet, in the 
future, learning models that start from the assumption of bounded rationality would become 
more useful in analyzing complex economies. Likewise, nonlinear modeling of financial 
economies in an economy wide sense will also gain ground. These are hopeful predictions; 
but given the needs of stabilizing the global economy there is a strong case to be made for 
further use and development of such models. 
 
On the other hand, the global economy is also a political economy. Hence the problem of 
global financial architecture--- to mention just one pressing global issue--- can not be simply a   3 
problem of technical economic and econometric modelling, no matter how sophisticated and 
“realistic”. In fact, it can be argued that a “realistic” model will have to include political 
economic elements--- at least implicitly. At the same time it must be recognized that the state 
of the art of such political economic modelling is still rather primitive. Instead of simplifying 
radically to fit the needs of formalization, much can also be learned from a rigorous ordinary 
language political economic analysis. Each of the country chapters in this book contains such 
analysis, as the astute reader must have noticed already.  The formal modelling and rigorous 
ordinary language analysis are in fact complementary.
3 
 
Instead of summarizing both these approaches on a chapter by chapter basis, I want to raise 
a more basic question here: what are the characteristics of the global financial markets that 
lead to repeated instabilities? Various theoretical answers to this question can be given, and 
many of them have been discussed in the preceding chapters. For the purpose of discussing 
the “complexity” approach developed in this book, several features of global financial markets 
are worth emphasizing. First of all, global capital and financial markets--- even more than 
purely domestic markets---- are characterized by serious problems of asymmetric and 
incomplete information. Second, these problems are faced by agents who are rational only in 
a bounded rationality sense. Third, the risky nature  of projects  can not always be completely 
priced even if there is no fundamental uncertainty; however, there could also be a Knightian 
type of uncertainty as opposed to just risk, or at least a Keynesian type of uncertainty where 
                     
3 A more detailed methodological discussion is given in my   "On Paradigms, Theories and Models", June 2002. 
University of Tokyo, CIRJE Discussion paper no.  2002-CF-156   4 
only qualitative comparisons of future states are possible. In either case, expected value 
maximization of portfolios is impossible, and much of the standard mean-variance or other 
techniques of statistical portfolio value analysis in the future becomes inapplicable. 
 
Even without the radical characterization of the capital markets under the third point above, 
the increasing international exposure of both equity funds in the advanced countries and the 
financial systems in the newly industrializing and other developing countries  has meant that 
in-depth information about the underlying values of the assets and liabilities are less than 
perfect. At the same time, the speed of shock transmission has increased because of 
technological advances and liberalization. This leads among other effects to a strong 
possibility of contagion that can be quite widespread. Another way of putting it is that 
contagion risk increases with financial liberalization in a world undergoing simultaneously an 
information technology revolution. 
In the discussion on corporate governance both the seriousness of agency problems and the 
wider context in which we need to address these were emphasized. For bank lenders and 
portfolio investors, the agency problems are exacerbated because they can exercise little 
control over the assets and their market values. No international safeguards except implicit 
bailout prospects by the IFIs or governments creating moral hazard may exist. If such 
bailouts come at some cost---thus mitigating the moral hazard problem to some extent---- 
then the logical loss-minimizing strategy is to avoid assets which can not be liquidated quickly 
if things go wrong suddenly. One logical outcome of this strategy is short-termism. The 
international portfolio investors and bank lenders use ‘rapid exit” as a means for dealing with   5 
and containing downside risk. Therefore financial “quick ratios” such as the ratio of a 
country’s short-term foreign liabilities to central bank reserves become signals to watch. 
Whenever, the signal indicates downside risk and someone acts to exit, a cascading 
downward rush towards lowering asset values and a financial crash may start. 
 
Another consequence of the above characteristics of the liberalization of emerging 
markets is that the fund managers do not see acquisition of control or even more information 
as a way to handle risk. Rather they seek portfolio diversification. This practice is justified by 
a theory that assumes a lack of covariance among the emerging market instruments so that 
different country risks can be played off against one another. However, this move can also 
lead to significant instabilities in the emerging markets, particularly when the fund managers 
act like a herd. It is also interesting to note that despite a large literature on equity market-
based(EMS) corporate governance system, such behavior does not always result in good 
corporate governance. In fact, the managers of firms have strong incentives to push for short-
term upward movement in stock prices. Under lax regulatory and accounting practices, these 
objectives can often lead to distorted information and misleading financial statements. This 
makes the goal of achieving a transparent and accountable financial system harder, not 
easier as some simplistic theories would predict. 
 
The main overall consequence for the financial and capital markets of the above 
observations is a complex kind of market failure. Asset prices and interest rates do not fully 
reflect risk. Lenders in the domestic markets usually---- though not always--- handle this type   6 
of failure through aggregate credit rationing. There are always potential  borrowers --- even  
borrowers willing to pay a higher than market rate of interest---- who are refused loans. This 
is consistent with the particular portfolio allocation rules adopted by rational lenders in such 
markets. Internationally, adverse perceptions of risk by lenders that may not be connected 
with long-term underlying asset values can destabilize these markets. It can be shown 
theoretically that adverse news in a world where the shock travels in a cascading nonlinear 
fashion, the cumulative effect can be a complete loss of foreign capital and reserves. This is 
in fact, embedded in our economy wide model. 
 
Add to this the fact that while the portfolio allocation rules in a developed country fund 
may be marginal adjustment overall, the emerging market part of this portfolio is far from 
marginal for the emerging market country. For this country--- for example Thailand in 1997--- 
the marginal adjustments by the developed country fund managers may lead to a huge 
outflow launching a full blown financial crisis. Thus unevenness of the economies has a 
significant role to play in explaining the capital account crises we have observed. 
 
The volatility of the short-term capital movements in turn can have real economic 
consequences. The actual impact depends upon the various linkages and the strength of the 
capital “surges”--- both in and outflows. But overall, the mean output may fall and variances 
of major macroeconomic variables may increase. This makes the problem of creating more 
productive investment, more and better paying jobs, and social safety nets for the vulnerable 
groups much more difficult. Given that the capacities of many states in developing countries   7 
are already quite weak in these respects, volatility definitely weakens these further. While we 
attempt to build the “missing institutions” in developing countries, the urgent problems of the 
weakest open economies need to be discussed also.  
 
Thus before going any further a detour to view the problems of poverty alleviation in these 
countries may throw some light on how different sets of economies must be dealt with 
differently in an uneven world. Thus for the poorer countries opening up should be 
accompanied by a flow of official and NGO aid with the condition that governance should be 
improved. New aid and investment policies must be connected to a new trade policy .   
Liberalizing the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) under which the industrialized 
countries would exempt imports from these countries  while maintaining tariffs on imports 
from other countries, is an urgent task.  The U.S. can take a bold step by unilaterally 
liberalizing its GSP towards indebted poorer countries.  This will generate not only the moral 
pressure for the other G-7 countries to follow but will in the meantime confer an advantage to 
U.S. firms trading and investing in these countries.  Even a gradual liberalizing would help 
enormously, although progress will be slower than in the case of immediate liberalization.The 
economic assistance policy needs also to be geared towards helping the small producers 
through providing funds and expertise .On the technological front, the G-7 countries and the 
multilateral aid agencies can help by financing and arranging for granting the poorer countries 
access to the global communications networks. 
   8 
To some extent, these problems are faced by other developing countries also, but not 
as severely. What happened during the Asian and Argentine financial crises was that many 
middle class people also faced the threat of sudden poverty. Creation of a safety net for 
these people in such (relatively more affluent ) economies is also an urgent task. Since the 
private sector is not entrusted with this task, at least in the short and intermediate terms, 
other actors have to step in. It should be recognized that poverty alleviation has been 
embraced as the major goal by the multilateral banks. Therefore, it is natual to expect them to 
play a leading role in this respect. To the extent, an increse in their capital base is necessary 
for this purpose, this should be accepted as a global responsibility. 
 
The prospects of global financing bring us back to the problems of the unevenness and other 
failures of global capital markets. In the discussion of global financial architecture, I 
emphasized the role a hybrid structure can play. I also emphasized the following two 
principles: 
 
1.The principle of symmetry, i.e., the surplus and deficit countries should be treated equally. 
However, it was not realized in the past; nor is it likely to be realized in the near future. 
However, there are various ways to pursue this as a goal even under the current set up of the 
IMF. If serious efforts are made to follow this principle by a reformed IMF, that will be an 
important step towards a new and better GFA.   9 
2.The principle of burden-sharing, i.e., during episodes of crisis management the IMF will 
share the management burden with the RFAs and through them also with the affected 
countries and their neighbors. 
 
   It should be kept in mind that in keeping with the “extended panda’s thumb” argument 
both the principles recognize the practical impossibility of the IMF being transformed into a 
global central bank in the near future. What the IMF cannot do now and will not be able to do 
in the foreseeable future is to follow Bagehot’s dictum to lend freely against good collateral at 
a high interest rate in time of crisis. Unless SDRs become the commonly accepted and easily 
expandable means of settlement, this role will remain foreclosed. It is unlikely that the 
principal shareholders of the IMF will allow such a change to occur.
4 Also, compared to a 
national central bank dealing with a problematic domestic financial institution the IMF has a 
limited ability to force corrective action. Yet, there will clearly be a role for IMF lending, and 
the consequent moral hazard will need to be recognized. But just as the moral hazard from 
having fire fighters ready to fight fires does not compel thoughtful communities to abolish fire 
stations, the global community also cannot abolish the IMF, or reduce its resources simply 
because there is a moral hazard problem associated with such institutions. The second 
principle above, the principle of burden sharing with the RFAs, national governments and the 
private sectors should go some distance towards both increasing the overall resources 
available, and mitigating the moral hazard.   10 
 
It has also been pointed out that while the Fund can not now, or even in the near 
future be expected to act as a global central banker, pressures for increasing the net supply 
and poor country allocations of SDR could have beneficial effects. Even if the increases are 
not significant in the short run, the tendency will keep alive the eventual goal of forming a 
global central bank, as Keynes had envisioned. More practically, putting pressures on the 
IMF to emit new SDRs in order to finance the stabilization of primary ( and perhaps other) 
commodity prices will lead to benefits for both the developing and the developed countries in 
the intermediate run. The stabilization of these prices will help many developing countries 
avert BOP disasters. Furthermore, to the extent that the unusual price increases, such as the 
oil price increase in the 70s, create general inflationary pressures  such pressures can also 
be averted. A smooth international transactions pattern will thus be consistent with domestic 
price stabilization as well.  
 
 I also emphasized that in addition, the Fund could make a concerted effort to manage 
the private creditors. Most important from the point of view of managing crises will be the 
incorporation of new provisions on loan contracts so that orderly work out procedures 
become feasible. The Fund can also lend into arrears as  a means to provide debtor-in-
possession financing. Such a provision, along with more direct measures vis-à-vis the 
creditors, can help to bring the creditors to the bargaining table during a crisis. 
                                                                  
4 However, this should not be ruled out completely. Pressures for increased supply of SDRs will be beneficial in 
specific ways as argued below.   11 
 
  But the major emphasis in terms of the proposal for a hybrid GFA has been on the 
role the regional financial architectures---if they were to be created--- could play in the future. 
Here it may be instructive to reconsider the Asian case.From the policy perspective, it is 
important to know if the existence of an Asian RFA would have helped in any way during the 
AFC. This is really a counterfactual question which asks: suppose there existed an RFA for 
Asia during the AFC, how would it have responded to the crisis that would have been 
different?  
 
In contrast with the behavior of the IMF, within the proposed hybrid GFA,a regional 
financial architecture, had it been present could have done at least the following on the basis 
of applying an evolutionary theory of financial instabilities under globalization: 
1.Through constant regional monitoring it would have sensed the danger ahead of time. 
Even a regional monitoring unit alone would have been able to do better than the IMF team in 
Asia. 
2.Through constant formal and informal contact with the officials in member governments 
and the private sector, it would have sized up the possible extent of the problem earlier and 
better than did the IMF. 
3.Through prompt and early action it would have provided liquidity to the system, and 
punished bad management in coordinated measures with the national governments. 
4.It would have been able to start regional discussions about bankruptcy and work out 
procedures by keeping in  close touch with the history and legal issues facing particular 
countries.   12 
5.It would have been in a position to use both moral suasion and toughness to keep both 
regional creditors and debtors in line. 
 
The fundamental requirement for this, however, was an actually existing RFA with 
enough liquidity and technical expertise. The Asian Development Bank provided quite a bit of 
liquidity to Korea in particular, but did not even have a monitoring unit when the crisis broke 
out. Furthermore, the autonomy and integrity of  any future RFA, in Asia and elsewhere are 
issues that need discussion. The relationship between the RFAs and the IMF also needs to 
be further specified. These are matters that are of necessity evolutionary by nature. 
 
What is important to realize is that the root causes of crises were not prevented from 
being actualized by the Washington consensus policies in effect. Accelerated financial 
liberalization, exchange rate anchoring, and encouraging private portfolio capital inflow did 
not lead to the desired growth and stability. To be sure, there may be short-term gains. But 
these gains can exacerbate herd behavior and problems arising from such behavior. Once 
the macroeconomic balances are obtained via structural adjustment and inflation is under 
control, market liberalization may bring in both financing for real sector projects and hot 
money. If all the main short-term indicators turn positive for a while investors tend to ignore 
some fluctuations. For example, large current account deficits--- Thailand readily comes to 
mind--- may be seen as really the simple algebraic counterpart to a positive capital account 
balance. Thus, an accounting, or at best a result of equilibrium in BOP is taken as a causal 
evidence for success in attracting foreign investment. By the same token--- as the chapter on 
corporate governance issues showed in detail---- corporate debt and high leveraging may be 
construed as global financial diversification. In retrospect, we can see that it requires much 
close analysis to determine whether the external deficit reflects a private savings-investment 
gap and rational decisions about intertemporal consumption smoothing. Private sector 
decisions have turned out to be much more myopic than assumed by the received doctrines.   13 
Our approach of boundedly rational agents teaches us to take myopic behavior seriously, and 
asks under what kind of environment caqn agents learn not to be myopic? 
 
Another failure has been that of the private credit rating agencies. These agencies failed 
to predict the collapse in both Mexico and Asia. Apart from problems with techniques that are 
backward-looking, there are deeper issues at stake here. The use of information by the rating 
agencies seems deficient. The tendency is to interpret matters in such a way as not to 
destabilize the market in a good equilibrium. But in a bad equilibrium the rating agencies also 
engage in herd behavior and rapid nonlinear downgrading can occur. There is also the 
question of how the ratings are used and the consequences following; but this is a systemic 
problem rather than that of the credit agencies. 
 
Because credit rating and its use are systemic issues, competent international bodies can 
play a stabilizing role here. In the hybrid global financial architecture propsed in this book, 
such public-private hybridity can also be helpful. In addition to investigating what role the IMF, 
possible RFAs and other international public bodies can play, we can also explore the 
prospects of using bodies such as  the International  Association for Insurance 
Supervisors(IAIS) and International Organization of Securities Commissions(IOSCO).
5 
 
Related to such hybrid structures are possible extension of bank supervision capabilities 
outside of G-10. The publication of the Basle Committee’s “Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision” establishing best practices has been a good step forward. Supervision 
of cross-border banking is another area of concern. The report on off-shore banking and “the 
Supervision of Cross-border Banking” received the endorsement of banking supervisors from 
140 countries in the International Conference of Banking supervisors in Stockholm. Although 
these are encouraging steps, much remains to be done. Also, much depends on the sharing   14 
of information and cooperation across borders among the supervisors. Regulatory 
forebearance is another problem that is relevant for both state-owned financial institutions 
and privately owned ones in many countries. 
 
Whether all these add up to an adequate framework for financial stability is the crucial 
question. The BIS now has an expanded membership. But the BIS itself has no regulatory 
functions as such, and seems reluctant to play a more active role. The US treasury also does 
not seem particularly willing to cede authority of cross-border intervention to a body it does 
not control. In effect, the G-7 countries themselves may not be able to agree on the role of 
BIS. Partly as a result of this, the US seems more content with the IMF expanding its regular 
article IV consultations with the member countries to examine the quality of domestic banking 
supervision. In a way, the IMFs move towards pressuring for capital account liberalization can 
be seen as a tactic to enhance its capacity to control the financial policies of the less powerful 
member countries. Reforming the IMF constitution in this direction will create additional risks 
from capital flow surges globally. The argument in this book has been that a hybrid structure 
that respects the practical policy issues arising from unevenness will be more stable than a 
sudden move towards uniform capital account liberalization. This conclusion seems to have 
been borne out by the facts of global financial instability even from such moves for a subset 
of developing and newly industrializing economies. 
While this book endorses the positive good that can come from enhanced cooperation 
discussed above, and from enhanced “mutual recognition agreements” there are problems 
that should not be overlooked. The US supported mutual recognition agreements, in 
particular, can become a form of disguised protection for the US banks and financial services 
institutions. At the same time such extension of mutual recognition would surely increase the 
extraterritorial powers of the US regulators such as the SEC and the Fed. Legally, it may also 
expose the US authorities to claims from the US investors if there were to be crises in 
                                                                  
5 In fact the Bank for International settlements(BIS) bid successfully to host IAIS in 1996. If BIS--- with 
cooperation from the US--- can become more capable of helping in the supervision of non-bank financial   15 
markets outside of the US whose regulatory system has been certified by the US through a 
mutual recognition system. But as I have emphasized, used with care--- keeping the above 
and other possible problems in mind--- these type of bilateral arrangements can also be a 
part of the hybrid system. 
 
There are other proposals such as the international credit insurance corporation that do 
not seem viable at the moment. Because of contagion risk, the pooling of risks necessary for 
any insurance scheme to work may be difficult if not impossible. Problems of moral hazard 
and adverse selection will arise more frequently and massively requiring premiums that may 
indeed be prohibitive. 
 
Once again, however, the prospects for funding this with new issues of SDRs is not 
without merit. Availability of a fund like this could mean conditional lending of last resort. Such 
lending could also happen more quickly than in the past cases. Having a large amount of 
international liquidity would also lessen the risk of a major asset deflation during crisis. After 
crisis, in order to mitigate any possible inflationary impact, the loans could be paid back 
quickly by the borrowing countries, or in some cases, long-term bonds could be issued. 
 
From the above discussion it should be clear that the creation of a new  hybrid GFA is the 
supreme political task of creating a new global political economy amidst the ruins of financial 
and real economic crises. The Asian financial crisis and the Argentine crisis both showed 
specific institutional features. They also showed the failures of the so-called “developmenmtal 
states’. The truth about these crises are that these are largely private sector problems in a lax 
national and global regulatory environment. Excessive lending beyond the dictates of 
prudential regulations, had they existed internationally or enforced properly, by private banks 
and non-bank financial intermediaries in developed countries to private banks and 
corporations in developing countries was at the core of the crises. Since this was not a 
                                                                  
institutions, that will be a significant step towards global stability.   16 
sovereign debt problem, the usual intergovernmental or IMF prescription was not likely to 
work and in fact did not work.
6 Another characteristic was the credit rationing in the global 
capital markets. It was the decisions of the lenders that dictated the capital flows. Hence, the 
so-called “developmental state” had in fact little to do with the heydays of success, or the 
bleak days of failure that followed. The only difference was that the bleak postcrisis days 
showed up the real weaknesses of these styates in the global political economy. 
 
Finally, the studies of the political economy of capital flows should pay close attention 
to the problems related to the lenders since these really are the key actors. The key problem 
faced by the lenders is that of managing risk by whatever means. Sometimes this may be 
consistent with a stab;e and orderly market---- the key goal of the national governments and 
the international authorities. But quite often as shown both empirically and theoretically, the 
private sector actions can be destabilizing. A deeper look at the problem really shows that a 
proper economic and political economy analysis both point to the problem of missing 
institutions. The foregoing analysis of crises largely underlined four types of missing 
institutions.  
 
First, there is the lack of a global central bank. This missing institution means that the 
job of providing enough liquidity, particularly during crisis can not be done adequately. As a 
result, illiquid, but not insolvent banks and financial institutions, as well as other productive 
enterprises may go bankrupt. As pointed out, the IMF is not up to this task now and may not 
be for some time. A hybrid structure with regional provision of liquidity is therefore an urgent 
reformist and  new institution-building task. 
 
Second, the need for international prudential regulation of financial services. As shown 
here, the Basle system is far from adequate. Again, a hybrid form with national and perhaps 
                     
6 Of course, questions can be raised as to whether the IMF recipe worked even in the sovereign debt case. For a 
review of the pro and contra literature on this, and  some novel theoretical arguments and empirical results in the   17 
regional components may be the best realistic response that the global system can make at 
this time. 
 
Third, many capital and financial markets—for example long-term bond markets--- are 
themselves missing. If not altogether missing, they are so thin that no real capital 
accumulation can occur through their marginal functionings. In developed countries this 
problem is addressed by the existence of market makers. In fact, these are considered so 
crucial that some theorists with in-depth knowledghe of real financial institutions, make the 
study of market making the starting point of their analysis. This is the approach followed, for 
example, by Charles Goodhart in his path-breaking study of monetary economics. The crucial 
point to recognize is that such market makers do not exist in most global financial markets. 
We do not know if and when they will emerge. We also do not know how their activities might 
be coordinated once they do emerge. In the mean time, no international body seems to be 
ready or capable of discharging the task of market makers. Here is a palpable concrete 
example of how complex developed financial economies really are. 
 
Fourth, as the chapter and particularly section on corporate governance and legal 
structures showed, transaction costs are indeed high without a smoothly functioning 
adequate legal system. While no unique system may be optimal--- the difference between the 
Common Law and the Continental Legal Systems shows this--- a certain degree of integrity in 
dispute settlement mechanisms including bankruptcy and orderly work out procedures may 
be essential. Without these, the rule for both foreign investors and domestic companies may 
be quick returns and capital flight in times of trouble. In a hybrid system, some degree of 
capital control and building of domestic legal institutions may be a prelude to creating a more 
appropriate body of regional and international dispute settlement mechanisms. 
 
                                                                  
African context, see Khan (1997c).   18 
Although we have not arrived at a complete theory of the new capital account type of 
financial crisis, the main outline is by now clear. Open capital account and weak banking and 
financial sectors are a combustible mix. In the presence of nonlinear, complex interrelations, 
discontinuities, uncertainty the behavior of boundedly rational agents may tend towards 
cascading herd behavior. Likewise, governments may also panic. Thus, on this “complexity” 
view of capital account crises, there is no magic formula short of complete autarky to prevent 
capital account crises. However, even under autarky there could be financial fragility arising 
from purely  domestic factors. Such fragility could also result in a financial crisis. Given the 
benefits of openness, autarky is really a counsel of despair. What is important to realize is the 
need to have a coupling of domestic policies and regulatory environment with the regional 
and global financial architecture. However, we must now, at the end of our endeavor turn 
from issues of pure finance to the broader question of the implications of sound finance for 
well-being. 
 
Sound Finance and  economic growth may go together under an appropriately designed 
global economic regime. However, the results of growth must still be evaluated from the point 
of view of human well-being. In the standard utilitarian approach this can be done by 
choosing an appropriate social welfare function(SWF) where both levels of income and the 
distribution of income are arguments. Given a preference for equality at a given level of 
income, technically certain SWFs are the only admissible ones.
7 
 
A more elaborate evaluation of well-being has been proposed by various theorists drawing 
upon the insights of Adam Smith. Sen is the originator of this “capabilities approach” in recent 
times. The theoretical criticisms of the utilitarian approach by Sen Nussbaum and others that this approach 
reduces all qualities into quanta of utilities is a serious one.  Nussbaum gives a graphic example of this by 
                     
7 For example, Schur-concave SWFs are such “equality preferring” SWFs.   19 
quoting the exchange between Mr. Gradgrind, economist and grief-stricken father, and his pupil Bitzer.  Bitzer 
outdoes his mentor by adhering to a strict code of utilitarian rationality that cannot comprehend a father's grief.  
I have pursued a similar line of criticism in a number of recent papers. And my book “Technology, 
Development and Democracy. This approach makes the capabilities explicitly social and asks: what 
concatenation of economic (real and financial ) and other (e.g., political, social etc.) institutions will allow 
capabilities to be both increase steadily on the average and tend to equalize them among diverse individuals? 
In effect, as the following discussion makes clear, we are asking: how can we increase and equalize real, 
positive freedom for individuals? 
 
  In discussing the well-being implications of sound global  finance, therefore, I wish to take a version of 
the social capabilities approach.  The institutional reforms and changes proposed here, and by scholars who 
suggest alternative structures , must be proven to be capability enhancing, or at least not to be capability-
reducing..But first we still need to ask:  What is meant by capabilities both abstractly and concretely? 
 
  Capabilities can be construed as general powers of human body and mind that can be acquired, 
maintained, nurtured and developed.  They can also (under circumstances such as malnutrition or severe 
confinement) be diminished and even completely lost.  I have emphasized elsewhere the irreducibly social 
(not merely biological) character of these human capabilities.  Sen himself emphasizes "a certain sort of 
possibility or opportunity for functioning. 
  In order to assess financial reforms and structures from a capabilities perspective we need to go 
further and try to describe more concretely what some of the basic capabilities may be.  David Crocker has 
given an admirable summary of both Nussbaum's and Sen's approach to capabilities in a recent essay.    20 
Mainly relying on Nussbaum but also on other sources (shown below), he has compiled a list that is worth 
reproducing here: 
 
  Basic Human Functional Capabilities (N and S stand for "Nussbaum" and "Sen", respectively; the 
quoted items come from Nussbaum unless otherwise noted). 
 
1.  Capabilities in Relation to Mortality 
1.1. N and S: "Being able to live to the end of a complete human life, so far as is possible 
1.2.   1.2. N: Being able to be courageous 
2. Bodily  Capabilities 
2.1.  N and S: "Being able to have good health. 
2.2.    2.2.  N and S: "Being able to be adequately nourished. 
2.3.  N and S: "Being able to have adequate shelter 
2.4.    2.4.  N: "Being able to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction" 
  2.5.  N and S: "Being able to move about from place to place 
3. Pleasure 




4. Cognitive  Virtues 
  4.1.  N: "Being able to use the five senses" 
  4.2.  N: "Being able to imagine" 
  4.3.  N: "Being able to think and reason" 
  4.4.  N and S: "Being acceptably well-informed
/ 
 
5. Affiliation  I  (Compassion) 
  5.1.  N: "Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves" 
  5.2.  N: "Being able to love, grieve, to feel longing and gratitude" 
   
6.  Virtue of Practical Reason (Agency) 
  6.1.  N: "Being able to form a conception of the good 
           S: "Capability to choose
 ; "ability to form goals, commitments, values 
  6.2.  N and S: "Being able to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's own life"
 
 
7.  Affiliation II (Friendship and Justice) 
  7.1.  N: "Being able to live for and to others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, 
     to engage in various forms of familial and social interaction" 
  7.1.1.  N: Being capable of friendship 
          S: Being able to visit and entertain friends 
  7.1.2.  S: Being able to participate in the community   21 
  7.1.3.  N: Being able to participate politically and being capable of justice 
 
8. Ecological  Virtue 
  8.1.  N: "Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of nature" 
   
9. Leisure 
  9.1.  N: "Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities" 
  
10. Separateness 
  10.1.  N: "Being able to live one's own life and nobody else's 
  10.2.  N: "Being able to live in one's very own surroundings and context" 
  
11. Self-respect 
  11.1.  S: "Capability to have self-respect" 
  11.2.  S: "Capability of appearing in public without shame" 
 
12. Human  Flourishing 
  12.1.  N: "Capability to live a rich and fully human life, up to the limit permitted by natural   
         possibilities" 
  12.2.  S: "Ability to achieve valuable functionings" 
 
  To facilitate this ordering, it might be better for practical rationality and affiliation to "infuse" but 
not "organize" the other virtues.  Crocker contrasts Nussbaum's approach with Sen's.  Sen's and 
Nussbaum's lists differ at a few points.  For Sen, the bodily capabilities and functionings (2) are intrinsically 
good and not, as they are in some dualistic theories of the good life, merely instrumental means to other 
(higher) goods.  In interpreting Aristotle, Nussbaum distinguishes between bodily functionings that are 
chosen and intentional, for instance, "chosen self-nutritive and reproductive activities that form part of a 
reason-guided life" and those that are non-intentional, such as digestion and other "functioning of the 
bodily system in sleep" (forthcoming).  She may want to say that intentional bodily actions that lead to 
being well-nourished and healthy are intrinsically good, but that being healthy or having good digestion 
are not functionings (because not intentional) and are valuable only because of what they enable us to do.  
Another option open to her would be to adopt Sen's view that bodily states and processes, whether   22 
intentional or not, both as intrinsically and instrumentally good but as less valuable than other inherently 
good capabilities/functionings. 
 
  Furthermore, Nussbaum has included items 5 and 8-10, for which Sen has no counterparts.  
These items are welcome features.  Item 8, which I have called "ecological virtue", is an especially 
important recent addition to Nussbaum's outlook.  In a period when many are exploring ways of effecting 
a convergence between environmental ethics and development ethics, it is important that an essentially 
anthropocentric ethic "make room" for respect for other species and for ecological systems.  Worth 
considering is whether Nussbaum's "ecological virtue" is strong enough.  Perhaps it should be formulated 
to read: "Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and nature as intrinsically 
valuable."  Item 9 injects some appealing playfulness in a list otherwise marked by the "spirit of 
seriousness."  What explains the presence of these items on Nussbaum's list, their absence on Sen's list, 
and, more generally, the more concrete texture often displayed in Nussbaum's descriptions?  One 
hypothesis is that the differences are due to Nussbaum's greater attention, in her Level 1, to the limits, 
vulnerabilities, and needs of human existence.  Further, it may be that Nussbaum's richer conception of 
human beings derives from making use of the story-telling imagination far more than the scientific 
intellect."
43/  On the other hand, Sen helpfully includes the good of self-respect, a virtue that enables him to 
find common ground with Rawls and to establish links with the Kantian ethical tradition, in which moral 
agents have the obligation to respect all persons, including themselves, as ends-in-themselves
/  
   23 
  Both Sen and Nussbaum agree, however, that these capabilities are distinct and of central 
importance.  One cannot easily trade off one dimension of capability against another.  At most, one can do so 
in a very limited way.  They cannot be reduced to a common measure such as utility. 
 
  As Crocker points out, "capability ethic" has implications for freedom, rights and justice going far 
beyond simple distribution of income considerations.  If one accepts the capability approach as a serious 
foundation for human development, then it follows that going beyond distributive justice is necessary for a 
complete evaluation of the impact of economic policies.  
 
 
  In evaluating  international financial regimes and national economic policies  from this perspective not 
only do we wish to pose the question of efficiency but also the whole set of questions regarding human 
freedom.  In particular, the positive human freedom to be or to do certain things.  Thus, creation of markets and 
efficient production by itself would mean very little if it led to a lopsided distribution of benefits.  Worse yet, if  
markets and other institutions led to phenomena such as reduced life expectancy, increased unemployment, 
reduced consumption levels for many and deprivation for certain groups such as women and minorities then 
they will not even be  weakly equitable  global economic structure.  On the contrary, under such circumstances, 
the global markets and other financial institutions will be strongly inequitable from the capability perspective. 
 
It is because of this perspective that the earlier positive analysis of the problems of global financial markets 
and institutions need to be put in a completely transparent “social capabilities” framework. Such a framework is 
openly normative and makes a strong ethical case for helping the disadvantaged increase their capabilities 
towards achieving equality of capabilities. Thus poorer nations and poor  people in the global economy 
deserve a special ethical attention within any proposed global financial architecture. As Khan(1998) shows in 
the context of adopting innovation structures leading to increased productivities, ultimately the aim of any 
increase in productivity needs to be the increase of freedom. Such freedom, as Sen (1999) points out has both   24 
an instrumental value and an ultimate value. Instrumentally, freedom as social capabilities can lead to a further 
increase in productivity. Thus even a hard-nosed, efficiency driven analysis must address this aspect as an 
empirically relevant issue. 
 
The thrust of the previous chapters has been to show how bad theories---- regardless of their ideological 
leanings, left, right or center---- can lead to bad policies. Likewise, a refusal to face up to serious ethical issues 
of equity and well-being for all can also lead to a  troubled society. As we move towards the creation of a global 
society where individuality and  rich diversity reflected in differences of cultures and social practices leading to 
well-being  are equally respected, we can do no less than a genuine attempt to approach the reforming  of old 
financial structures and building new financial institutions with a clear ethical perspective of global citizenship. 
Efficiency and equity are both important and sometimes can be achieved together. At other times at least short 
run trade offs must be considered carefully. Here, the advances in economic theory --- both positive and 
normative--- can play a modest but useful role. Therefore, In the realm of crisis prevention and crisis 
management, the minimization of costs and the maximization of the benefits from any  financial system must  
be guided by advances in both  positive economic theories and  in  economic ethics. 
 
If the main argument advanced in this book is correct, the global financial markets need monitoring and a 
proper global financial architecture needs to be erected for both efficiency and equity reasons. From the 
efficiency side the argument ---- in a world of undiversifiable systemic risks---- has been quite clearly one of 
exercising prudence through appropriate national and international institutional arrangements that can 
formulate and implement policies better than in  the past. On the equity side, the foregoing argument would 
lead towards creating institutions and policies that protect not just creditors, but also the ordinary citizens. In 
particular careful attention must be paid to the problems of the disadvantaged and the vulnerable groups. 
Adequate social safety nets must be in place before the crisis, and swift response after the crisis to meet their 
urgent needs must be ensured. A more democratic decision making before the  crisis could better realize such 
administrative structures. Once again, good governance at all levels is essential. If the 21
st century is to be  
safer with a more civilized  global society then these democratic imperatives must be heeded along with the 
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